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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the main effects of the credit guarantee scheme (CGS)
for Portuguese micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) initially adopted in
2009. The study relies on three large-scale data sources, with individual information for
all Portuguese non-financial corporations and banks, to assess the impact over credit ad-
ditionality and the ex-post performance of participating firms. By applying a difference-
in-difference matching approach, the results have shown that the program helped partici-
pants to improve their access to the credit market, increasing the overall amount of loans
granted, the proportion of long-term debt and reducing their interest expenses and the
probability of default. Moreover, there is also statistical evidence of economic spillovers,
such as employment growth and exports volume. The scheme also helped the Portuguese
banking system to reduce their risk exposures, improving their capital ratios under the
Basel Accord. Nevertheless, the results show that there is room for improvement in the
scheme design and features, in particular for credit lines targeting medium-sized or ex-
porters firms.
KEYWORDS: Credit, loan guarantees, SMEs, policy evaluation, banking, propensity
score, average treatment effect, PME Investe
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1 INTRODUCTION
Economic theory often agrees on the important role that Small and Medium Enter-
prises (SMEs) play in economic growth, job creation, social cohesion and regional devel-
opment. However, most SMEs face several obstacles when trying to finance and develop
their activities, especially due to credit market imperfections (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt,
2006; Laeven, 2003; Gelos and Werner, 2002). As Stiglitz and Weiss have shown in their
seminal article (1981), the lack of individual information often leads to market failures,
in particular, because banks cannot precisely assess a project’s riskiness and are often
forced to offer similar contracts to firms with different probabilities of success. To over-
come this issue, banks commonly rely on collateral requirements as a screening device
(Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a). The literature has shown that, by committing
a portion of their assets, SMEs can mitigate credit rationing (Beck et al., 2010). Pledging
collateral shows the borrower’s willingness to repay its loans, thereby reducing adverse
selection and moral hazard problems (Deelen and Molenaar, 2004). This solution re-
duces the lender’s risk of default (Coco, 2000), and decreases the banks’ monitoring costs
(Cowling and Mitchell, 2003). However, due to their size or age, most smaller firms do
not have enough assets or a long enough credit history to meet the credit requirements
(Columba et al., 2010), and so their access to the credit market remains restricted. As
a solution, some policy makers and commerce associations have relied on Credit Guar-
antee Schemes (CGSs) to increase the overall amount of credit available in an economy
(Llisterri, 1997; Levistky, 1997b; Cowling and Mitchell, 2003).
CGSs are multilateral agreements between lenders, borrowers and guarantors. By
pledging a guarantee, the latter tries to offset a SME’s lack of collateral and, therefore,
help constrained firms access the credit market. Over the past several years, CGSs have
become increasingly important, in particular after Basel II (and Basel III) Capital Accords,
which, after certain conditions are met, can help a bank mitigate its credit risk and improve
its capital requirements (Casasola et al., 2008). These schemes also seemed to have gained
momentum, especially during economic downturns, when most firms are unable to find
funding sources in the traditional credit market (Uesugi et al., 2010; Riding, 1998).
Portugal was no exception, and the financial crisis (and subsequent sovereign debt cri-
sis) in that country led to a significant contraction in economic activity and credit supply
(Farinha and Félix, 2015). This adjustment affected both the non-financial and financial
sectors in Portugal. Amplified by the crowding out effect on financial markets (OECD,
2014), the crisis resulted in a significant increase in overdue loans and in stronger capital
requirements for banks (Figure 1). Altogether, the aftermath of the financial crisis led to a
long period of credit contraction, during which an increasing number of Portuguese SMEs
were unable to meet their debt payments. During this period, Portugal had in place a set
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of actions that may have prevented an even more severe contraction and bank freezes,
including a CGS.
Source: Banco de Portugal
FIGURE 1: PERFORMING AND OVERDUE LOANS IN PORTUGAL
Although CGSs are popular, the economic literature remains inconclusive about their
net effect on the funding and performance of small firms. Some authors argue that CGSs
are effective instruments for promoting credit growth among participants (see Boocock
and Shariff, 2005; Mankiw, 1986; Gale, 1990 and 1991; Riding et al., 2007) or that
they reduce the cost of borrowing (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009; Columba et al., 2010).
Meanwhile, others are more sceptical about the net effect on credit, claiming that lenders
perform a loan portfolio substitution, that is, they replace non-guaranteed loans with guar-
anteed loans without expanding their overall loan portfolio (Vogel and Adams, 1997).
Ultimately, aside from the theoretical debate, the actual impact of these programmes also
remains an empirical challenge. Hancock and Wilcox (1998), Craig et al. (2004, 2007)
and Hancock et al. (2007) defend the effectiveness of these schemes after analysing a
set of aggregated data. However, this empirical strategy has the disadvantage of omitting
the firms’ responses to the programme as a factor. By contrast, Cowling (2010) relies on
microdata to show that participants in the United Kingdom (UK) were less likely to expe-
rience a credit reduction, after the introduction of a CGS. Riding and Haines (2001) and
Riding et al. (2007) also presented empirical evidence for a positive impact on other vari-
ables, such as job creation, for firms that joined a Canadian CGS scheme. More recently,
Duarte and Gama (2018), relying on data from one participating bank, studied the credit
impact of a Mutual Guarantee Society (MGS) in Portugal for a limited number of firms.
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However, the applicability of the results of most of these studies remains limited by the
empirical approach adopted, which has focused only on the credit impact on participating
firms, without a proper comparison to non-participating firms. The identification of a pol-
icy’s net effects is challenging because participating and non-participating firms may be
intrinsically different, and some of these differences may be unobservable. The present
article tries to overcome these limitations. First, it is based on three data sources from
2005 to 2013, consisting of individual balance sheet information, credit and guarantees
granted, using data for all Portuguese non-financial corporations. Second, it measures
the treatment effects of the Portuguese CGS by implementing a difference-in-difference
matching algorithm, allowing a comparison between participating firms and the control
group. The study of these effects is not limited to the firms’ credit; it also includes a
broader range of ex-post impacts, including job creation, the probability of defaulting,
international trade and the firms’ net value. Finally, the research design assumes that the
effects of credit lines may be different across the firms’ size and programmes, contributing
to the debate about which scheme design is optimal. To this end, the study is structured
as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the literature and establishes the relevance
of CGSs for SMEs. Section 3 describes the Portuguese CGS and establishes the hypoth-
esis to be tested. Section 4 and Section 5 present the data sources, model and empirical
strategy that were adopted for the study. Section 6 concludes the paper by assessing the
overall effects of the programme and detailing its impacts for different SMEs’ sizes and
credit lines.
2 SME LENDING AND CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES
Micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises are frequently hailed as the backbone of
the economy (Green, 2003). However, the slowdown in economic growth experienced
since the beginning of the century, the challenges introduced with the globalisation, the
fear of industrial setbacks and the recent financial crises contributed to the resurgence of
academic and policy interest in industrial policies directed to these firms. Often, these
public interventions are based on a combination of various subsidies, which may take the
following form: (i) grants, defined as a monetary payment in the form of a lump sum,
most frequently as a proportion of the investment; (ii) tax incentives, in the form of ex-
emptions/reductions or as a tax credit; (iii) subsidised public loans, with lower interest
rates than those charged in the credit market; and finally (iv) guarantees, in which a pub-
lic entity absorbs a significant part of the risk of default, allowing constrained firms to
access the credit market, and risky-but-creditworthy firms to get financing at a lower cost
(D’Ignazio, A. and Menon, C., 2012). The rationale for the introduction of such policies
underlines the consensus that SMEs face additional obstacles to assess banking credit
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or even government funds to finance their economic activities (European Commission,
2005). In particular, the higher costs of small-scale lending, lack of collateral, reduced
reliability of (often non-audited) financial statements, asymmetric information and dif-
fering liability structure obstruct these firms from meeting the contractual requirements
demanded by financial institutions (Beck, T. et al., 2008). CGSs policy initiatives arise
as both a reaction to this lack of collateral in smaller companies, and a means to mitigate
the risks faced by lenders. Altogether, by introducing these systems, policy makers seek
to diminish information problems in the credit market and, therefore, improve the overall
conditions for SME financing (Green, 2003; Uesugi, I. et al., 2010).
2.1 Credit markets and asymmetric information
In light of economic theory, credit markets can be explained intuitively using a model
of supply and demand. When there is an excess of credit demand – the desired amount
of credit is higher than what banks are able to grant at a market price – the financial insti-
tutions will be urged to raise the price of credit (the interest rate), matching demand with
supply, and leading to profit maximisation (Cowling, 2010). However, the empirical evi-
dence shows that this equilibrium is not easily reached, raising the question of why banks
refuse to grant loans to some firms, even at a higher price (Cowling, 1999; Levenson and
Willard, 2000; Storey, 1997). The debate about how the asymmetric information restricts
the credit granted to the real economy was launched in the literature by the seminal arti-
cle of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). In this study, the authors showed that the asymmetries
between borrower and lender information lead to an equilibrium below the optimal level
of lending. The authors identified two main issues – adverse selection and moral hazard
– both of which affect the quality and total amount of loans granted.
2.1.1 Adverse selection
The adverse selection problem starts with the lack of information available to lenders
when assessing the quality of borrowers. The expected returns for the bank depend on
the probability of repayment, so banks should be able to identify borrowers who are more
likely to repay their loans. However, in the absence of more information, it is difficult
to distinguish ‘good borrowers’ and, to do so, banks must introduce a set of screening
mechanisms, such as the interest rate. The problem here is that an increase in interest
rates, whether due to a higher credit demand or as a screening mechanism, leads to a
market equilibrium where only those firms that invest in riskier projects (higher returns,
but lower probability of success) are willing to pay the higher interest expenses.
On the other hand, increased costs will also induce the remaining companies to adopt
riskier investment strategies, to reach a rate of return high enough to repay their debt
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service costs. Thus, the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model shows that, in spite of credit de-
mand, there is an optimum interest rate in the credit market that minimises the number of
risky projects and banks’ potential losses. As a result, the credit supply will be negatively
sloped, and the equilibrium will be reached by credit rationing.
2.1.2 Moral hazard
The second problem – moral hazard – results from borrowers’ behaviour after ac-
cessing credit and incurring its monitoring costs. To minimise information asymmetry,
financial institutions often rely on two mechanisms: (i) improving the economic condi-
tions for firms that follow the objectives initially set, for example, by renewing the loan
with a lower interest rate; and (ii) demanding that firms pledge part of their assets as
collateral, which could be exercised in case of default. These information problems, and
higher monitoring costs, lead to a scenario where the credit granting process is driven not
only by the banks’ profitability, but also by a more careful and prudent assessment of the
quality of borrowers, relying on such metrics as firm size and collateral pledged. This
naturally results in a market equilibrium where smaller companies may be deprived of
funds for new investment projects.
These information asymmetries encouraged the economic literature to study the col-
lateral pledged by firms when contracting loans, particularly as an indicator of borrower
quality and as a method applied by banks to mitigate these information problems (Be-
sanko and Thakor, 1987b; Bester, 1994; Cowling, 2010). In fact, Bester has argued that
the introduction of collateral eliminates any credit rationing. According to this author,
the firms with prudent investment projects signal their willingness to repay their loans by
pledging part of their assets. On the other hand, riskier borrowers with a higher proba-
bility of default will be more reluctant to pledge any collateral, thereby being subject to
higher interest rates or even rejection of their funding requests. However, this argument
is not universally accepted in the literature, with Besanko and Thakor (1987a) arguing
that collateral is not an accurate indicator of the quality of borrowers. For these authors,
the amount of collateral required may exceed the value of assets available, leading to an
equilibrium where credit is rationed even among firms less likely to default, as shown
in the aforementioned theoretical model developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1987). These
information asymmetries in the credit market became one of the main arguments for the
policy makers to promote CGSs, especially programmes targeting smaller firms that have
a limited amount of assets to pledge as collateral.
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2.2 Credit guarantee schemes - Overview
According to the European Commission, the CGSs are ‘collective initiatives of a num-
ber of independent companies or their organisational representatives. Its main objective is
to collect a set of guarantees for loans granted to its members, who directly or indirectly
participate in the formation and asset management of the system’ (2005, p. 10). These
systems have their origin in the late 20th century, but have recently become increasingly
important in the funding of small and medium-sized firms (Beck et al., 2010).
Guarantee schemes have subsequently become widespread in both developed and de-
veloping economies1, and are often listed by international organisations as a policy rec-
ommendation (OECD, 2013). For policy makers, the attractiveness of these schemes
derives from their multiplier effects (Table I) and from their ability to move private cap-
ital (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003), but also due to the possibility of recovering a large
share of the public funds by the end of the programme (D’Ignazio and Menon, 2012). For
participants, CGSs are a mechanism to increase the overall volume of credit available,
especially to small firms lacking sufficient collateral. This feature is commonly known
as ‘additionality’ (Riding et al., 2007).2 By reducing the risk taken by lenders, this pol-
icy also has the potential to reduce the cost of small-scale loans, while improving both
access and banks’ knowledge of small borrowers. More recently, with the adoption of
Basel II (and III), these societies have become particularly important for financial sys-
tems, given that when certain criteria are met, they allow banks to mitigate the credit risk
for loans granted to SMEs and consequently to ensure the required capital and liquidity
ratios (Casasola, M. et al., 2008).




Overall increase of credit granted to SMEs.
Riding and Haines (2001) Employment and tax revenue growth.
Bradshaw (2002)
Potential increase in international trade of goods
and services.
Riding et al. (2007)
Potential spillovers resulting from the development
of a new commercial relationship between financial
institutions and SMEs by reducing the adverse
selection and monitoring costs for subsequent loans.
1At the beginning of the 21st century, there were more than 2250 distinct systems, spread across 100
countries (Green, 2003).
2In North America, literature refers to this property as ‘incrementality’.
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In general, these systems rely on three economic agents – the borrower, the lender and
a guarantor. Obviously, each of the parties has different incentives to join these schemes.
The borrower is typically a SME seeking funds to run its business. The lender is a pri-
vate financial institution that pursues profit maximisation by using a screening device to
identify credible signals from the borrowers. However, this sorting process carries high
fixed costs and is considered to be one of the main obstacles to credit granting (Riding
et al., 2007). To overcome this, the two agents may rely on a third party – the guarantor.
Normally, this is a government agency or a trade association that issues a guarantee to the
creditors, as a predetermined percentage of the loan.
Beyond the relationship between borrower and lender, these schemes also create a link
between guarantor and lender. The policy maker must therefore define a set of system
parameters and incentives, considering not only borrowers’ but also lenders’ motivations.
In general, the guarantor has the power to establish four types of criteria: (i) eligibility; (ii)
the guarantee level granted; (iii) the fees charged;3 and (iv) the scope of discretion left to
lenders.4 These parameters obviously differ according to the purposes of and participants
in the scheme in question. For some countries, its primary objective is to increase the
amount of credit available for SMEs5 (e.g., Canada, France and the UK). Meanwhile, in
other cases (e.g., some programmes in the USA), these schemes are only applicable as
a last resort, acting when firms cannot find the necessary funds in the capital markets.6
Finally, other systems grant these guarantees to companies that otherwise would have to
shut down their activity (e.g., Japan; see Nitani and Riding, 2005).
Besides having different purposes and motivations, the organisational structure of
these programmes also changes from country to country, depending on the operating
model chosen. The literature identifies five broad models, namely mutual guarantee so-
cieties, purely public systems, enterprise systems, bi-lateral or multi-lateral systems and
schemes managed by non-governmental organisations (Green, 2003). The mutual guaran-
tee societies have become the most widely adopted structure and can also be classified into
two types, according to the source of its funding. First, mutual guarantee associations (for
example, Confidi in Italy) are purely private organisations formed by borrowers to share
their debt risk. This type of scheme tends to be more permissive to adverse selection
problems, because higher-risk firms with limited access to credit have move incentives to
3Generally, the guarantor establishes the fees to cover the costs associated with failure or to preserve the
integrity of capital associated with the programme.
4In some systems, the entity offering the guarantees specifically decides which applications receive the
requested loans, such as in Canada, while in other legal frameworks, as in the UK, the guarantor can only
review the applications.
5Please see Llorens (1997).
6In some programmes in the United States of America, only companies whose loans applications have
previously been refused by financial institutions are eligible for funding.
13
PEDRO PÓLVORA
ARE THE CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES EFFECTIVE IN PORTUGAL?
EVIDENCE FROM PME Investe PROGRAMME
join this organisational model. Second, publicly backed mutual societies, which are cre-
ated on a regional or national basis, and are often managed by government agencies or a
specific legal entity created for this purpose. In this case, the organisation’s resources are
often public and available for a limited period. This structure is particularly relevant in
lower-income economies, and is the most popular scheme in developed countries (Beck
et al., 2010); this model was adopted for the Portuguese credit guarantee scheme.
3 THE POLICY
The current design of the Portuguese’s credit guarantee scheme started to be imple-
mented in 2002 by the Institute to Support Small and Medium Enterprises and Innovation
(IAPMEI)7. The scheme followed a structure similar to others adopted across many coun-
tries in Europe (Columba et al., 2010), and its main aim was to increase the supply of
credit to SMEs. Within this overall structure, three mutual guarantee societies were cre-
ated8 – Norgarante, Lisgarante and Garval – being responsible for monitoring and provid-
ing resources for all Portuguese Society of Mutual Guarantees (SPGM) operations.9 The
first credit line was formally introduced in July 2008, under the name Programa PME In-
veste, the main goal of which was to improve SMEs’ access to the credit market, through
interest rates subsidies and by pledging a pre-determine amount of collateral (guarantee)
for bank loans.
The process to join the programme also follows a similar approach to the model
adopted in several southern European countries (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009). Each
credit-guaranteed transaction requires the agreement of three parties: a small business
borrower, a financial institution, and a mutual guarantee society representing the national
‘reinsurance’ fund (i.e., Mutual Counter Guarantee Fund). In Portugal, this fund is mainly
backed by public funds and covers part of the risk incurred by MGSs and, thereby, lever-
aging their ability to support SMEs (Duarte et al., 2018). Initially, the firms’ applications
are filed by the banks on behalf of the borrowers. The MGS then conducts a credit assess-
ment of these applications, based on such key metrics as the firms’ financial statements,
their industry sectors and growth prospects. Once the application is approved and the
guarantee credit is granted, the SMEs must buy a share in the SPGM. This share corre-
sponds to 2% of the issued guarantee, acquired from the promoter or another mutualist
(i.e., another shareholder), which can be back-sold at its nominal value to SPGM or an-
other participant firm after leaving the programme. The borrower is also obliged to pay a
7The Portuguese CGS was formally created in 1994, as part of the broader programme Programa Es-
tratégico de Dinamização e Modernização da Indústria (PEDIP)
8Decreto-Lei No. 211/98 published in Diário da República Portuguesa.
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commission annually, usually ranging from 0.5% to a maximum of 4.5% of the guarantee
granted. Although the scheme is supported by public funds, these two features provide a
mutualist character to all transactions. Finally, the SPGM, or one of the banks, is respon-
sible for collecting the loan re-payments.
Between 2008 and 2010, and as part of the policy response to the tightening conditions
to access the credit market created by the financial crisis, the scheme established six credit
lines, amounting to EUR 9.092 million. Altogether, these lines covered around 10.1% of
the total credit granted to SMEs by the financial sector in Portugal during this period.
Most of these loans had an initial amortisation period of 3 to 5 years, with the guarantees
covering from 50% to 75% of the total amount. Initially, only six banks decided to join
this system.10 Unlike major programmes adopted in other countries (see Levistky, J.,
1997a) the access to these credit lines was not very restrictive (Table II), allowing many
firms to join the scheme.
TABLE II: ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Programme line
I Do not have any unjustified incidents or defaults in
banking sector
All
II Do not have tax arrears All
III Be a micro-, small- or medium-sized enterprise as defined
in Commission Recommendation C(2003)1422.1
All
IV
Had a positive net profit in the last year and at least two
positive results in the last four years, or two positive net
profits if the firm has been in operating for less than four
years
All
V Required to keep the same number of employees, at the
date of signing the contract, until the loan is fully repaid
All
1 Note: Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro-, small-
and medium-sized enterprises (C(2003)1422) (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36).
Despite these general criteria, the scheme also introduced some specific credit lines
focussed on particular economic sectors and specific purposes. For instance, PME Investe
II and III allocated part of their funds to tourism, catering, automobile or retail sector;
while, on the other hand, PME Investe III and VI endowed a specific amount to export-
ing firms. Nevertheless, these five criteria (Table II) were universally adopted across all
programmes.
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3.1 Programa PME Investe III and IV
This study focuses on two credit lines launched in 2009 (PME Investe III and IV).
These two programmes can be considered the first nationwide CGS in Portugal, with a
total budget of EUR 3.850 million.11 Together, these two credit lines targeted a broad
category of firms – the export sector and small and micro-enterprises – and covered most
SMEs in Portugal, offering them a first opportunity to participate in a credit guarantee
scheme.
TABLE III: PME INVESTE III AND IV MAIN FEATURES
Credit line
Export Sector Small- and Micro-Enterprises
(PME EXP) (PME SME)
Year 2009 2009
Total amount EUR 1 831 million EUR 1 429 million
Month January and June January and June
Targeted firms
· Firms headquartered in mainland
Portugal
· International transactions must be
10% or higher of firm’s annual
turnover
· PME firms in Portugal, with a




· Investment in tangible or
intangible fixed assets
· Improve operating or working
capital
· Improve working capital
Credit maximum
value EUR 1 000 000
· EUR 25 000 (Micro-Enterprises)
· EUR 50 000 (Small Enterprises)
Credit minimum
value EUR 100 000 NA
Maximum credit
length 3 years 3 years
Type of credit Long- and medium-term bank
loans
Long- and medium-term banking
loans
Collateral value 50% of the loan 75% of the loan





Euribor interest rate (3 months)
minus 1%, until a lower bound of
1.5%
Euribor interest rate (3 months)
minus 0.25%, to a lower bound of
1.5%
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The programme provided different conditions to each group (Table III). Although
the range of investments covered by these programmes was wide, the benefits granted
differed significantly between exporting firms and small or micro-firms. For instance,
while one line focused on reducing the interest rate (PME EXP), the other focused on
pledging a larger amount of collateral (PME SME). As mentioned before, the latter feature
is particularly important for firms that try to access the credit market for the first time and
do not have enough assets to pledge as a guarantee.
Also important, apart from being the first nationwide programmes, the two credit lines
incorporated special conditions to identify and measure the programme impact. Initially,
the amount and maturity of the loan differed depending on the credit line for which the
firm was eligible. Also, three additional criteria are implicitly defined for the group of
PME SMEs. The firms should have fewer than 50 employees, its annual turnover should
not exceed EUR 10 million and the combined proportion of imports and exports should
be less than 10% of its annual turnover.
3.2 Programme aims and expected outcomes
The main purpose of the programme was the same regardless of the size of firms tar-
geted. According to policy makers, its primary objective was to help SMEs access the
credit market. Therefore, one expected outcome was to increase the overall amount of
credit granted, especially to smaller firms that enter this market for the first time. This
suggests implicitly that the program was able to reduce the information asymmetry in the
Portuguese credit market, specifically the role of adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Moreover, by developing new commercial relationships between SMEs and finan-
cial institutions, the scheme also helped to reduce their monitoring costs (as suggest by
Riding et al., 2007).
Hypothesis 1 (Credit additionality). The overall amount of loans should increase for
the firms participating in the PME Investe III and IV.12
Hypothesis 1a (Credit additionality – Moral hazard). The scheme is expected to
contribute to reducing the banks’ monitoring costs. In particular, it should help firms to
establish borrower-lender relationships that continued after the end of the programme.
Hypothesis 1b (Credit additionality – Adverse selection). The programme should be
especially efficient at increasing the amount of credit granted to smaller firms that had
limited capital to pledge as a guarantee or that accessed the credit market for the first
time.
The scheme also offered special conditions to improve its participants’ debt structure.
12This overrules the substitution effect (Hypothesis 3) that the increase of guaranteed loans is offset by a
decrease of non-guaranteed loans, which would result in an insignificant increase in the credit market.
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One of its primary features was the introduction of subsidised interest rates to reduce
firms’ costs of borrowing. Moreover, the loans were granted with an average maturity of
three years, helping the participants to restructure their credit debt and reducing the need
for short-term funding. It is, therefore, expected that the scheme would help companies
to reduce their financing costs and increase the proportion of long-term loans on their
balance sheets.
Hypothesis 2 (Debt structure and funding costs). The scheme should help treated
firms to decrease their short-term funding needs and, consequently, to reduce their interest
expenses.
Another important feature of this programme is that the credit risks are shared be-
tween the guarantee scheme and the bank. By insuring only a proportion of the loan, the
scheme implicitly encourages the bank to assess and monitor closely the loans granted.
This is especially important to ensure that lenders mitigate the likelihood of default. After
the 2008 financial crisis, banks were forced to raise capital or decrease their risk-weighted
exposures. Under the Basel Accord, non-guaranteed loans have a risk weight of 100%,
while guaranteed loans are weighted at 10%. This may have encouraged banks to replace
non-guaranteed with guaranteed loans and, due to the increasing provision costs and in-
ternal synergies to oversee these loans, banks were exhorted to carefully monitor their
exposures in order to reduce Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) on their balance sheets.
Hypothesis 3 (Substitution effect). The increase in guaranteed loans is expected to
be offset by a decrease in non-guaranteed loans, resulting in a limited growth in overall
credit (as Vogel and Adams, 1997).
Hypothesis 4 (Monitoring effect). The scheme created internal synergies, allowing
banks to monitor closely the loans granted under this programme. This should effec-
tively reduce the likelihood of firms’ defaulting and the amount of overdue credit on their
balance sheets.
As stressed by Bradshaw (2002), some CGSs also focused on promoting employment
and firms’ exports. The programme PME Investe is no exception, and was also designed
to guarantee that participants experienced a wider range of effects. For instance, enrolled
firms were not allowed to reduce their number of employees, implying a direct impact
on the job market. Likewise, a distinct line was created for exporting firms, aiming to
promote their competitive advantage in international markets.
Hypothesis 5 (Economic spillovers). Although the scheme focused on increasing
the credit granted to SMEs, it should also have additional effects on a set of economic
variables.
Hypothesis 5a (Employment). Participant firms should, at least, maintain their work-
force numbers during the length of the programme.
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Hypothesis 5b (Exports). The participant firms in PME EXP are expected to increase
their volume of exports.
Last, but not least, the Portuguese scheme also states that these loans should be used to
invest in fixed assets (PME EXP) or to enhance operating capital (PME EXP and SME).
Although profitability was not a main feature targeted by the programme, the scheme
design may implicitly improve the overall profitability of participating firms. In fact, Dia-
mond (1989) argues that, in a situation of asymmetric information, many profitable invest-
ment opportunities are left unfunded in the unfettered equilibrium.13 Uesugi et al. (2010)
add that the introduction of CGSs alleviates this pressure, creating room to finance riskier,
but also profitable projects. This implies that participants will increase their investment
rate during the programme and, therefore, achieve higher earnings in the medium-term.
The effect should be stronger for those firms obliged to increase their investment in fixed
assets (PME EXP).
Hypothesis 6 (Investment effect). The ex-post performance of participant firms, in
particular for PME EXP, should show that they can implement profitable projects with
positive net present value.
4 DATA
4.1 Data sources
This study relies on information from three data sources. The first set of variables was
derived from the Portuguese data set ‘Simplified Corporate Information’,14 which com-
prises detailed balance sheet information on the universe of Portuguese non-financial cor-
porations. This database has a longitudinal dimension, given that each company is identi-
fied using a unique code. This strategy allowed firms’ economic activity to be tracked for
the period from 2005 to 2013.
The second set of variables was calculated using the Central Credit Register (CCR).
This is a database collected by Banco de Portugal from all financial intermediaries legally
authorised to operate in Portugal (Antunes et al., 2010). This data set has a signifi-
cant level of granularity and provides information, at the year-end, for the credit balance
granted by all banks, distinguished according to financial product, credit maturity and
loan status. Furthermore, a complementary CCR database was used, containing infor-
13Please note that this assertion is dependent on the risk-return relationship of investment projects. While
Mankiw (1986) and Gale (1990, 1991) consider second-order stochastic dominance, in which projects with
higher expected returns are not implemented in an unfettered pooling equilibrium, DeMeza and Webb
(1987) assume first-order stochastic dominance, and conclude that any unfunded project has a negative net
present value and, therefore, that government intervention is not needed.
14The Informação Empresarial Simplificada (IES) is a joint project of the Ministry of Finance and Public
Administration, Ministry of Justice, National Institute of Statistics and National Central Bank of Portugal.
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mation on the collateral pledged. This additional database includes information for each
borrower, guarantor, guarantee value and amount of each loan. Cross-referencing this in-
formation with the credit database allowed the firms that enrolled in the PME programme
to be identified, along with the value of the collateral pledged.
Given the high number of observations obtained by combining the information avail-
able in these three databases,15 it was necessary to pre-process the final data set. The first
criterion was to select only the entities that remained active for at least four consecutive
years. This condition is based on the programme’s minimum loan duration of three years,
and due to the fact that this study aims to observe the company´s financial behaviour be-
fore and after joining the scheme. Moreover, given that the relevant period starts in 2008,
this requirement allows us to estimate the initial impact of the loan, as well as measuring
its subsequent effect over three additional years.
On the other hand, the observations lacking some of the information needed to esti-
mate the variables of interest were excluded. Companies without data regarding their as-
sets, net income, turnover, liabilities and interest payments were removed from the study.
Also, only the sectors targeted by the programme were considered, and firms classified as
Holding Companies were also excluded. Finally, observations above the 99th percentile
or below the 1st percentile were treated as outliers.16 The final sample includes data for
86 089 firms for up to nine years.
This data set has two primary advantages over those employed in other studies. First, it
is focused on the PME programme, allowing us to precisely establish the beginning of the
treatment for each participant. Most empirical studies only have information on whether
a company is participating or not, without specifying when they joined the programme.
Second, given that the panel covers nine years, it allows both short- and medium-term
effects of the programme to be studied. Although cross-sectional data may be used to
identify whether the introduction of a credit guarantee programme produces an immediate
increase in loan availability, there are also additional longer-term effects that can only be
assessed using panel data, such as the profitability and default probability of firms.
4.2 Variables and summary statistics
Four groups of variables were chosen to characterise the firms’ features, namely their
ability to access the program, their general characteristics, their degree of engagement
with the financial sector and their performance before and after joining the programme.17
15The initial database comprised 2,008,343 observations.
16Most of these criteria are defined following recent studies that use the same databases. See, for example,
Farinha and Félix (2015).
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The first set of variables focused on the ability of individual firms to access the pro-
gramme. This includes variables distinguishing whether a firm is eligible for the pro-
gramme (ELIGIBLE) or credit line (e.g., EXT. TRANS. >= 10%), and whether mutual
guarantee societies (MGS) have any influence on the firms’ probability of joining the
scheme. Although the other three groups also include variables that affect firms´ decisions
about participating in the programme, such as the ability to pay their debt (DCOVER) and
interest expenses (ICOVER), most of those variables address the impact of the programme
on the subsequent performance of firms. This includes such financial indicators as the
share of bank loans among total liabilities (LOAN RATIO), the return on assets (ROA) and
firms’ total number of employees (EMP).
Table IV presents a set of summary statistics for sample firms for the year before
the introduction of the PME Investe programme, dividing the sample into companies that
enrolled in the scheme and those that did not access it.
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TABLE IV: SUMMARY STATISTICS
BEFORE ACCESSING THE PROGRAM
All firms Participating Non-participating
Mean Mean Mean




















































































































18Value in EUR, measured in the first year of the programme.
19Measured in the first year of the programme.
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All firms Participating Non-participating
Mean Mean Mean





































































































N 86 089 16 596 69 493
Frequency 19.3% 80.7%
The descriptive statistics show a significant difference between participating and non-
20Ratio of profits to interest payments (Interest coverage ratio). 1 if the ICOVER is less than one, 0
otherwise.
21Ratio of profits to total credit (Debt coverage ratio). 1 if the DCOVER is less than 10%, 0 otherwise.
22Ratio of firm’s net worth to total assets (Capital Ratio). 1 if the Capital Ratio is negative, 0 otherwise.
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participating firms. The proxy variable identifying the firms’ eligibility for the programme
has a significant discriminant power, covering almost the full sub-sample that accessed
the scheme. Moreover, the companies that joined the programme showed a stronger and
closer relationship with the banking sector in Portugal, even before accessing the pro-
gramme. On average, these firms had twice the value of loans compared to the remainder
of the sample. Also, on average, these companies relied on more than one bank when
seeking credit while showing significantly lower interest expenses.
The firms that enrolled in the programme seem to be more profitable and in less fi-
nancial distress than others. Participating companies showed a positive ROA, while only
a small proportion (1.1%) recorded negative capital (NEGATIVE CAP.) in the year before
joining the scheme. These are two key indicators used to assess a firm’s cash-flow and
its ability to repay debt, which apparently excluded a significant number of participants
from the programme. The differences between participating and non-participating firms
are therefore significant, and a simple empirical strategy of comparing the average results
between these two groups is not suitable.
5 METHODOLOGY
The data shows that a simple comparison between the ex-post performance of partic-
ipating and non-participating firms is not appropriate. In general, the firms participating
in the programme do not represent a random sample of the population. This means that
the same company characteristics that influence its participation in the programme, may
also influence the firm’s performance in the future. For instance, a riskier firm without
sufficient collateral will have a greater propensity to access the scheme and use its credit
guarantee. Simultaneously, a less risky firm that already relies on banking credit as its
main source of funding, would also have a financial record that allows the bank to run a
more precise assessment and, therefore, would face a lesser risk of adverse selection by
the bank. Moreover, as argued by Stiglitz and Weiss (1987), high-risk firms are likely
to have fewer profitable investment opportunities compared to ‘safer’ firms, which may
affect their financial performance and future ability to repay their loans. Altogether, a
simple comparison between treated and non-treated firms may therefore lead to an under-
estimation of the programme’s impact.
This is a common problem when evaluating policy interventions, and has been studied
extensively in the literature (Heckman et al., 1999). To overcome this obstacle, the liter-
ature suggests a set of methods, drawing on the use of natural experiments, to evaluate
treatment effects in the absence of true experimental data. These methods propose several
solutions to the problem of generating the comparison group needed to perform a valid
evaluation of these programmes (Centeno et al., 2008).
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The typical methodologies proposed to address these issues are difference-in-difference
approaches (Meyer and Nagarajan, 1996; Abadie, 2005) and matching methods (Rubin,
1977; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 2006). The difference-in-difference matching
method has been proposed by Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) as a
combination of the two former methods. It was recently reviewed and compared with the
other methods by Smith and Todd (2005) and has the potential benefit of eliminating some
sources of bias present in quasi-experimental settings, improving the quality of the results
significantly. Moreover, this is a well-grounded and tested approach, commonly applied
in the literature to assess the efficiency of CGSs in countries such as Canada (Clark et al.,
1998) and Japan (Uesugi et al., 2010).
The characteristics of the dataset and programme implementation in Portugal provide
a special opportunity to construct treatment and control groups. In particular, they allow
an exploration of (i) the existence of data for the pre- and post-programme periods, and
(ii) the variation resulting from the participation in the programme (which generates spa-
tial and temporal differences). The sample includes pre-treatment and post-treatment ob-
servations, which can be used to implement estimators from the difference-in-difference
class.
5.1 The model
Let Y Dit be the outcome of interest for firm i at time t given its state D, where D = 1
if exposed to the programme, and 0 otherwise. Let treatment take place at time t. The
identification problem lies in the fact that one cannot observe, at time t, firm i in both
states and, therefore, measure the simple individual treatment effect,Y 1it−Y 0it . However, if
provided with an adequate control group, it is possible to estimate the average effect of the
treatment on the treated. The method applied is often known as difference-in-difference
(D-in-D) and compares the average behaviour before and after the programme for the
treatment group with the before and after measures for the comparison group (Blundell
and Costa Dias, 2000).
The underlying idea of a D-in-D estimator is that it can be used with an untreated
comparison group (counterfactual) to identify variation in the outcome that is not due
to the treatment. However, to achieve an identification of the general D-in-D estimator
it must be assumed that the average outcomes for treated and control cases would have
followed parallel paths over time. This is known as the common trend assumption:
E
[




Y 0it − Y 0it′ | D = 0
]
(1)
where t′ is an observation before programme implementation. The assumption states
that the temporal evolution of the outcome variable of treated individuals (D = 1), if
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they had not been exposed to the treatment, would have been the same as the observed
evolution for individuals not exposed to the treatment (D = 0).
If the assumption expressed in (1) holds, the D-in-D estimate of the average treatment
effect on the treated can be obtained by the sample analogues of
αD−in−D = {E [Yit | D = 1]− E [Yit | D = 0]} − {E [Yit′ | D = 1]− E [Yit′ | D = 0]}
(2)
where Yit is the observed outcome for individual i at time t. As showed before, this
approach measures the impact of the programme by the difference between participants
and non-participants in the before-after difference in outcomes.
The common trend assumption can be too severe if the treated and control groups are
not balanced in covariates that are believed to be associated with the outcome variables (a
common problem referred to as the Ashenfelter’s dip, after Ashenfelter (1978)). The D-
in-D setup can be extended to accommodate a set of covariates, which is usually done in
a linear fashion. The formulation below considers eligibility-specific and time/aggregate
effects. In the following model, α̂D corresponds to this estimate and is obtained for a
sample of treatment and control observations:
Yit = λD + ητt + θ
′Zit + αDDτt + εit (3)
Where D is as before and represents the eligibility specific intercept, in this case
defined as the variables listed in Table II along with a set of variables defined according
to the rules of the scheme, τt captures time/aggregate effects and equals 0 for the pre-
programme period and 1 for the post-programme period. Z is a vector of covariates
(pre-determined with respect to the introduction of the programme) included to correct
for differences in observed characteristics between firms in treatment and control groups.
This estimator allows the analysis to control for differences in Z and for time-specific
effects, but it does not allow αD to depend on Z nor does it impose a common support on
the distribution of the Z’s across the four cells defined by the D-in-D approach (the before
and after observations, and the treatment and control groups). Additionally, as pointed out
by Meyer and Nagarajan (1996), this process might be inappropriate if the treatment has
different effects for different groups in the population.23
These pitfalls can be mitigated by supplementing the D-in-D estimates with propen-
sity score matching. The Difference-in-Difference Matching (DDM) estimator imple-
mented follows Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) and Smith and Todd (2005). Intuitively,
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benefits may arise, compared to the simple D-in-D estimator, because the matching ver-
sion ensures comparability of the observable covariates that characterise the propensity
score matching estimator. The feasibility of this matching strategy relies on a rich set of
observable individual characteristics, those included in Z, and is used to guarantee that
the distribution of the meaningful individual characteristics for the definition of the out-
come is the same in the difference-in-difference cells. The matching process models the
probability of participation and matches individuals with similar propensity scores. The
common trend assumption behind the DDM estimator (Smith and Todd, 2005) is
E
[




Y 0it − Y 0it′ | P (Z) , D = 0
]
(4)
where P (Z) = Pr (D = 1 | Z) is the propensity score. The set of variables in Z
typically includes information on the firms´ characteristics and possible relationship with
the banking sector. Thus, the key identifying conditions affecting the growth are condi-
tional on Z, and this implies (4) via properties of the propensity score (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983). The DDM estimator also requires the support condition of a nonparticipant
analogue for each firm, formally that Pr (D = 1 | Z) < 1. As pointed out in Heckman
et al. (1997, 1998), it is important to guarantee that we can find a match for programme
participants, to guarantee that the condition Pr (D = 1 | Z) < 1 is satisfied. Indeed, if
there are regions where the support of Z does not overlap for the treatment and control
groups, one should restrict the matching to the common support region to avoid a major
source of bias in quasi-experimental programme evaluations (Heckman et al., 1998).
Using the repeated cross-sectional dimension of the data, it can be implemented the
DDM estimator following Smith and Todd (2005):
α̂DDM = E
[
Y 1t − Ê
(




Y 1t′ − Ê
(
Y 0t′ | P
)]
(5)
where Ê (Y 0t′ | P ) and Ê (Y 0t | P ) represent the expected outcome for individuals in
the control group and for those matched with those in the treatment group, respectively,
in the after and before periods. To guarantee that, in each period, the distribution of
the relevant characteristics is the same for treatment and control groups, observations in
the four cells (Before/After; Treatment/Control) are required to have propensity scores
within the same range. In practical terms, this approach restricts the computation of the
average treatment effect on the selected units so that, after being successfully matched in
each period, they have propensity scores within a common range among the four cells,
ensuring common support as required in Smith and Todd (2005).
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5.2 Implementing the matching process
When implementing a propensity score matching (PSM) process, there are three fun-
damental stages to consider (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). As a first step, one must
decide how to estimate the propensity score. Then the matching algorithm must be cho-
sen, and the region of common support needs to be determined. To conclude, the match-
ing quality must be assessed, which also means testing the sensitivity of the estimated
treatment effects or the failure of the common support condition.
The quality of the estimated propensity scores is one of the cornerstones of a success-
ful matching procedure (Centeno et al., 2008). At this initial stage, the estimation of the
propensity scores entails two decisions: (i) the model to be used for the estimation and
(ii) the variables to include in the model specification. While the selection of the model
type is rather straightforward, revolving around the ubiquitous choice between probit and
logit models, the second decision, concerning the set of variables to be included, is less
consensual and more crucial towards the successful use of propensity score matching
models. While some studies, such as Augursky and Schmidt (2001) and Bryson et al.
(2002), suggest the use of parsimony models, Rubin and Thomas (1996) recommend an
over-parameterised specification.
In this way, although there is no generally-accepted method to specify a propensity
score model, the literature provides advice regarding the inclusion (or exclusion) of co-
variates. First, the variables included should influence the treatment status and outcome
variables simultaneously (Sianesi, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005). Extensive literature has
demonstrated that such factors such as firm size, financial performance and the previous
credit level are important determinants of credit market access. Therefore, the inclusion of
these variables in the model is justified not only due to its effect on the outcome variable,
but also because it is rather likely that selection on observables (by banks and MGS enti-
ties), if it takes place, is based on such characteristics. Moreover, the model also includes
variables such as programme eligibility that rely on the firm’s financial indicators, which
affect both likelihood of access to the programme and the potential outcome variables.
Finally, the model controls for business activity and for regional differences, which may
be less important in determining the treatment status, but are clearly important to control
for differences in firms’ performance.
The matching estimation approach itself follows the one suggested in Caliendo and
Kopeining (2008). The procedure starts by applying a logit model to estimate the proba-
bility of firms’ joining the PME in year t, conditional on covariates observed in the previ-
ous year (Z). The firms (borrowers) participating in the programme (PMEt = 1) provide
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P (Zt−1) ≡ Pr (PMEt = 1 | Zt−1) (6)
where Zt−1 is a vector of firm characteristics in year t−1. The variables are measured
in the year before the participation, ensuring that they are unaffected by the programme,
as mentioned in Heckman et al (1999).
The second step is to apply the matching algorithm, guaranteeing that all our observa-
tions are inside the support area (common support). The treated observations are selected
from the participant pool and matched with the control group, using a kernel matching
algorithm. This is a non-parametric matching estimator that uses weighted averages of
all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome (Caliendo
and Kopeining, 2008). As Smith and Todd (2005) noted, kernel matching can be seen as a
weighted regression of the counterfactual outcome on an intercept with bulks given by the
kernel weights. These weights depend on the distance between each individual and the
control group and the participant observation for which the counterfactual is estimated.
One main benefit of this set of approaches is the lower variance, which is achieved
because more information is used. A shortcoming, though, is that possible observations
used might be bad matches. A proper imposition of the common support criterion is
therefore of paramount importance (Heckman et al., 1998).
Implementing the common support condition ensures that any combination of char-
acteristics observed in the treatment group can also be found among the control group
(Bryson et al., 2002). A simple criterion for common support is to delete all observations
whose propensity score is smaller than the minimum or larger than the maximum in the
opposite group. However, this paper has adopted a more robust and conservative approach
suggested by Smith and Todd (2005), applying a trimming procedure to determine com-
mon support. According to this method, the region of common support is defined as those




Pq : f̂ (P | D = 1) > q and Pq : f̂ (P | D = 0) > q
}
(7)
where f̂ (P | D = 1) > q and f̂ (P | D = 0) > q are non-parametric density estima-
tors and q is a percentage of the remaining P points exceeding zero. So, by following
this approach, not only are the P points for which the estimated density is exactly zero
excluded, but also an additional density of P that exceeds zero by a threshold amount of
q is also left aside. In this study, the common support exercise benefits from a large pool
of firms from which to draw units with ‘common’ characteristics. Allowing the algorithm
to assure common support across all four groups and that only a few observations are
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dropped from the full sample.24
In the third and last stage, the annual performance of a set of variables is compared to
the treatment and control group for years t − 1 to t + i, where i = 0, 1, 2, 3. The main
advantage of adopting this matching estimation approach is that it allows the treatment
and control observations to be matched according to their scalar propensity score. The
propensity score is the conditional probability of being treated given the observed charac-
teristics, and is a useful variable when dealing with a high-dimension vector of covariates.
In their seminal article, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that treatment observations
(in this case, those who accessed the PME programme) and control observations (those
who did not) with the same propensity score value have the same distribution over the
full vector of covariates. In this study, to achieve the same probability distribution of the
covariates for the treatment and control observations, it is sufficient to match in terms of
propensity scores – balancing score P (Z) – and firm size (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
However, as a final step, one must ensure that the treatment effect estimator is unbi-
ased, by satisfying the balancing hypothesis:
PMEt ⊥ Zt−1 | P (Zt−1) (8)
In other words, for a given propensity score, a pool of treatment and control obser-
vations should exist, which are, on average, identical. Therefore, after implementing the
matching estimation, condition (8) should hold. The testing procedure adopted follows
Sianesi (2004) and compares the logit model estimation of (6) and the equivalent estima-
tion using the data set containing only the treatment and control samples. If the balancing
hypothesis is satisfied, the treatment and control firms should be identical and Z − 1 does
not distinguish PME users from the matched non-users. This is tested by calculating the
pseudo R-squared and the likelihood ratio statistic, which tests the null of all the parame-
ters being jointly zero after the sample matching. A detailed assessment of the matching
quality is shown in Appendix A.2 Assessing the quality of matches.
6 ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF THE PME PROGRAMME
The empirical analysis therefore starts with a logit model to estimate the firms’ propen-
sity to join the programme. In the second phase, the overall treatment effects of the PME
programme are estimated. Finally, the sample is split according to the targeted firms of
the programme and a set of heterogeneous effects and spillovers are measured.
24The number of removed observations is shown in Appendix A.2 Assessing the quality of matches.
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6.1 Probit and propensity score estimation
The procedure starts by estimating the propensity score for each firm (Eq. 6). As pre-
viously discussed, the propensity score is the conditional probability of participating in the
PME programme in year t, given the values observed in the previous year. The dependent
variable is a binary variable indicating the firm’s participation in year t (PMEt) and Zt−1
is a vector of explanatory variables, divided into four groups. The first set (Programme
accessibility) includes the variables related to eligibility requirements, the second (Bank
relationship) describes the degree of firms’ financial involvement with the banking sector.
The third (Performance) groups some key indicators on firm performance, while the last
set (General characteristics) includes information on the industry sector, size, value and
external transactions. The following model was estimated:
Pr (PME = 1 | Zt−1) = Φ (β0 + β1Programme accessibilityt−1
+ β2Bank relationshipt−1 + β3Performancet−1
+ β4General characteristics) (9)
Table V shows the estimation results and the conditional probability (dy/dx) of partic-
ipating in the scheme. All the variables included in the first set (Programme accessibility)
are positive and significant. As expected, this implies that the selection criteria have a
positive influence on the conditional probability of enrolment in the scheme. In fact, the
dummy variable that identifies the firm’s eligibility for the programme is the most relevant
for the model (with an increase in the overall probability of 32.7%). Furthermore, there
are statistically significant differences across the mutual guarantee societies that assessed
the firms’ applications, showing that companies who had their credit reviewed by MGS
A had a higher probability of accessing the scheme.
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TABLE V: LOGIT MODEL




ELIGIBLE 2.525 (0.051)*** 0.327 (0.006)
EMP <= 50 0.445 (0.121)*** 0.058 (0.016)
EXT. TRANS. > 10% 0.124 (0.024)*** 0.016 (0.003)
TURNOVER <= 10 million 0.573 (0.168)*** 0.074 (0.022)
MGS A 0.318 (0.029)*** 0.041 (0.004)
MGS B 0.256 (0.066)*** 0.033 (0.009)
Bank’s relation
LOAN RATIO 0.795 (0.038)*** 0.103 (0.005)
SHORT RATIO 0.399 (0.027)*** 0.052 (0.004)
BANKS 0.756 (0.018)*** 0.098 (0.002)
Performance
ICOVER Dummy -0.106 (0.032)*** -0.014 (0.004)
DCOVER Dummy 0.114 (0.034)*** 0.015 (0.004)
NEGATIVE CAP Dummy -1.754 (0.077)*** -0.227 (0.010)
General characteristics
SMALL 0.458 (0.024)*** 0.059 (0.003)
MEDIUM 0.925 (0.119)*** 0.120 (0.015)
lnASSETS 2.079 (0.156)*** 0.269 (0.020)





1 Note: The dependent variable is measured in year 2009, while the explanatory variables are mea-
sured in 2008.
* Significance level of 10%.
** Significance level of 5%.
*** Significance level of 1%.
The results related to firms’ connections to the financial system, although interesting,
are also not surprising. The companies that already rely on banking credit as a primary
source of funding (LOAN RATIO) and have a stable relationship with the banking sector
(BANKS) show a greater propensity to join the programme. Interestingly, the entities that
have a higher short-term credit volume (SHORT RATIO) are also more likely to apply for
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the programme. This implies that loan-dependent firms, especially those reliant on short-
term loans, are more prone to use the programme. Moreover, both results suggest that
the scheme may have been used to increase firms’ credit maturity, allowing companies to
restructure their debts.
The same applies to firms that are ‘distressed’ to the point of insolvency (a NEGATIVE
CAPITAL ratio), which are less likely to join the programme successfully. This outcome is
not unexpected, as this is a key criterion used by banks for credit assessment and reflects
a legal requirement to join the scheme. Note that the above results do not contradict
the prediction of adverse selection, in that low-quality firms tend to use the CGS while
high-quality firms avoid using it. In fact, one may see that although the companies with
negative business profits (ICOVER) are unlikely to see their credit requests approved, the
firms with a greater ability to repay their debts (DCOVER) are also less likely to apply
for the programme. Taken together, this implies that financially distressed firms show a
higher propensity to use the guarantee, as long as they are solvent.
Last, but not least, the firm size variables (EMP and ASSETS) are significantly posi-
tive. This suggests that firm size also plays a significant role in the conditional probability
of accessing the scheme; this is one of the reasons to include a quadratic term for total as-
sets to control for the largest firms in the sample. By contrast, companies that are already
depended on exports to increase their turnover are less likely to use the programme. The
literature also shows that these companies, due to their sound financial structure, have
access to other types of loans to fund their economic activities.
6.2 Treatment effect
Following the empirical approach described above, the treatment effect of the PME
programme is estimated by matching each treated observation in year t (16 596 observa-
tions) with the closest bucket of non-user observations in the same year, using a kernel
algorithm. After implementing the matching process, the balancing condition is tested.
While the pseudo R-squared in the full sample estimation is 0.189, once it is limited to
only include treatment and control observations, the equivalent R-squared drops to 0.001.
Thus, the null hypothesis that all parameters are jointly zero, with the p-value of 0.955,
cannot be rejected25.
The impact of the programme is measured on borrowers’ credit availability (Total
amount of credit, proportion of long-term credit, interest rate and probability of default),
financial (ROA, net profits and default ratio) and economic performance (Number of em-
ployees, firms’ net value, exports and turnover). For each group of treatment and con-
trol, the difference is estimated for each variable between periods t + i and t, where
25A detailed sensitivity analysis is shown in Appendix A.2.
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i = 0, 1, 2, 3. For example, the first difference for the total credit amount is estimated as




t , where j = {Treatment, Control} .
Then the treatment effect is estimated as a second difference between the treatment and
control groups. For this specific case, the difference in the credit amount will be given by
∆2CREDIT jt+i = ∆CREDIT
Treatment
t+i −∆CREDITControlt+i .
The results are presented in Table VI. The treatment effect estimated for the entire
sample is considered the base case. For each variable, there are four estimates of the
treatment effect corresponding to each of the four different time horizons. The first two
columns respectively show the average of each variable for the treatment and control
groups. The last column presents the treatment effect (or the difference-in-differences






















































































Effect1Treatment Control Treatment Control
∆ CREDIT
t 0.565 0.175 0.391***
∆ EMP
t 0.010 -0.005 0.015***
t + 1 0.585 0.201 0.385*** t + 1 0.036 -0.006 0.042***
t + 2 0.450 0.086 0.364*** t + 2 0.031 -0.014 0.045***
t + 3 0.260 -0.078 0.338*** t + 3 -0.005 -0.064 0.059***
∆ LONG
RATIO
t 0.156 0.027 0.130***
∆ NET VALUE
t 0.022 0.021 0.001
t + 1 0.162 0.062 0.101*** t + 1 -0.113 -0.114 0.001
t + 2 0.119 0.051 0.069*** t + 2 -0.095 -0.097 0.002*
t + 3 0.119 0.072 0.047*** t + 3 -0.079 -0.081 0.002**
∆ INTEREST
RATE
t -0.049 -0.029 -0.020***
∆ TURNOVER
t -0.074 -0.085 0.011*
t + 1 -0.054 -0.038 -0.015*** t + 1 -0.025 -0.046 0.022**
t + 2 -0.041 -0.026 -0.015*** t + 2 -0.043 -0.081 0.037***
t + 3 -0.028 -0.018 -0.010*** t + 3 -0.116 -0.162 0.047***
∆ p(DEFAULT=1)
t 0.013 0.023 -0.010***
∆ EXPORTS
t -0.010 -0.007 -0.003*
t + 1 0.021 0.029 -0.009** t + 1 0.096 0.091 0.004
t + 2 0.042 0.051 -0.010* t + 2 0.244 0.180 0.064*
t + 3 0.074 0.080 -0.006 t + 3 0.325 0.227 0.098**
∆ DEFAULT
RATIO
t 0.000 0.001 -0.001**
∆ ROA
t -0.006 -0.006 -0.000
t + 1 0.001 0.002 -0.001* t + 1 -0.007 -0.007 0.000
t + 2 0.002 0.005 -0.003*** t + 2 -0.016 -0.020 0.004*
t + 3 0.007 0.009 -0.002* t + 3 -0.024 -0.027 0.003
∆ NET
PROFITS
t -0.005 -0.007 0.002
t + 1 -0.004 0.000 -0.005
t + 2 -0.038 -0.043 0.006
t + 3 -0.059 -0.057 -0.003
1 Note: For each group of treatment and control, the difference is estimated for each variable between periods t + i and t, where i = 0, 1, 2, 3. The treatment effect is estimated as a second difference
between the treatment and control groups.
* Significance level of 10%.
** Significance level of 5%.
*** Significance level of 1%.
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There is a strong and overall evidence of positive treatment effect for loan addition-
ality. That is, compared to non-participants, participants showed a significant increase in
loan volume, particularly in the first year of the programme (Hypothesis 1). More im-
portantly, this effect lasted for four consecutive periods, and remains even when there is
a decreasing trend in the credit market (Hypothesis 1b). The first differences show that,
while untreated firms experienced a significant decrease in a longer horizon, the treated
companies were still able to keep a credit level 26.0% higher when compared to the base-
line level. Both results confirmed that the scheme’s effects remained after the programme
ended (33.8%), corroborating the first two assumptions of credit additionality.
Furthermore, the treated firms also experienced a meaningful change in their credit
structure (Hypothesis 2). Between t−1 and t, the proportion of long-term loans (∆LONG
RATIO) increased by 13.0% for participants and remained higher over a longer period
(4.7% higher after four years). The treatment effect for the interest payments (∆INTEREST
RATE) also confirms this change, with participants showing a reduction of its average in-
terest rate of 2.0 p.p. and 1.0 p.p. in the first and last periods, respectively. The effect
over the proportion of defaulted loans also shows that the borrowers’ quality of treated
firms slightly improved, with a DEFAULT RATIO 0.2 p.p. lower than among the control
group (Hypothesis 4). Taken together, both results confirm that the programme granted
more liquidity to treated firms, helping to alleviate their refinancing needs and decrease
their interest expenses.
There is also substantial evidence that economic performance improved for the scheme’s
participants (Hypothesis 5). Table VI shows that participants increased their workforce
(∆EMP) in the first three years, while non-participants recorded a modest decrease. More
importantly, while in the last period there was reduction across the full sample, the impact
for treated firms was to a lesser degree, with this group showing a significant and posi-
tive treatment effect of 5.9% (Hypothesis 5a). This outcome corroborates the impact on
employment and reveals that the consequences of the programme were not limited to the
availability and type of funding.
In fact, as suggested in the literature, the scheme has positive spillovers for the eco-
nomic performance of participating firms (Hypothesis 5). Even though turnover (∆
TURNOVER) decreased across the sample, the programme participants experienced a
smaller reduction compared to non-participants. This difference is particularly signifi-
cant after the end of the programme, when the treatment effect was 4.7%. These results
also suggest a positive impact on treated firms’ exports (∆EXPORTS), showing a posi-
tive treatment effect of 9.8% in the last period (Hypothesis 5b). The participant firms’
value (∆NET VALUE) was also affected, albeit not immediately, with a positive aver-
age treatment effect of 0.2 p.p. Altogether, there is statistical evidence that the scheme
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showed positive spillovers, contributing to improvement in the participants’ economic
performance.
Nevertheless, the financial performance of treated firms shows mixed effects. Al-
though the likelihood of participants defaulting (∆p(DEFAULT=1)) is lower during the
programme, there is no statistical evidence that this difference remains after the credit line
ends (Hypothesis 4). This shows that banks’ credit supervision may have been an impor-
tant feature in the scheme, playing a key role in monitoring the borrowers’ performance.
This resulted in a double and positive effect for the Portuguese financial system. First,
as the enrolled firms experienced a lower probability of default, the banks were able to
reduce their provisions, and consequently their capital requirements, for these loans. Sec-
ond, under the Basel Accords, it is significant that the guaranteed loans have a risk weight
only of 10% (instead of 100% for nonguaranteed loans), enabling the banks to reduce
their overall risk exposure. Taken together, and aside from the direct impact on treated
firms, the results also suggest that the scheme helped the participant banks to improve
their capital levels.
Moreover, even though the firms increased their investment, there is no statistical
evidence that they could find more profitable projects (∆NET PROFITS and ∆ROA) when
compared to the control group (Hypothesis 6).26 In fact, profitability was not one of
the main features targeted by the programme. However, so as to improve the overall
performance of participating firms, this outcome suggests that further mechanisms could
be introduced to control firms’ investment plans.
6.3 Treatment effects across programmes and subsamples
The previous section (6.2) shows that the base case estimation provides evidence to
support credit additionality (Hypothesis 1), decreased funding costs (Hypothesis 2) and
economic spillovers (Hypothesis 5), including job creation (Hypothesis 5). Nevertheless,
several issues remain unaddressed, such as whether the scheme was able to increase the
amount of credit granted to smaller firms (Hypothesis 1b); and whether it promoted export
growth for those participants targeted by the EXP credit line (Hypothesis 5b). Moreover,
by measuring various effects across firm sizes and credit lines, it may also help shed some
light on how to improve the design of the scheme and make it more efficient.
This section studies the main effects across different subsamples and the two credit
lines. The results are shown, respectively, according to the targeted outcome: credit addi-
tionality (Section 6.3.1), economic spillovers (Section 6.3.2) and participants’ profitability
(Section 6.3.3).
26A caveat has to be made, since the four periods may not be enough to measure this effect.
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6.3.1 Impact on credit
The previous estimation shows that the PME Investe programme increased the overall
amount of credit available for participating firms. However, as discussed in Section 3,
this scheme targeted different firms and incorporated distinct features in its credit lines.
For instance, while the SME line tried to overcome the lack of capital so that smaller
companies could access the credit market, by covering 75% of the loans granted, the
EXP programme granted larger loan amounts and, simultaneously, focused on reducing
financing costs for participants. Following the theoretical literature, one might say that
these two lines were purposely designed with different objectives. Nevertheless, it is
important to measure whether these goals were accomplished and, more importantly, the
differences between the participants in these two lines.
The results are shown in Table VII. The first three columns show the estimated treat-
ment effect for each size of firm. Columns 4 and 8 show the estimated individual effect of
the two credit lines, while columns 5 to 7 and 9 to 10 distinguished the individual effects
















































































TABLE VII: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT ON TREATED
CREDIT
Programme
EXP Programme SME Programme
Variables Micro Small Medium Total Micro Small Medium Total Micro Small
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
CREDIT
t 0.452*** 0.376*** 0.282*** 0.402*** 0.872*** 0.399*** 0.200** 0.356*** 0.414*** 0.308***
t + 1 0.457*** 0.374*** 0.296*** 0.398*** 0.784*** 0.418*** 0.152* 0.328*** 0.422*** 0.262***
t + 2 0.401*** 0.366*** 0.231** 0.414*** 0.834*** 0.440*** 0.074 0.288*** 0.361*** 0.242***
t + 3 0.360*** 0.347*** 0.214** 0.424*** 0.855*** 0.451*** 0.040 0.235*** 0.323*** 0.195***
LONG RATIO
t 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.135*** 0.111*** 0.128*** 0.101***
t + 1 0.084*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.113*** 0.104** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.087***
t + 2 0.044*** 0.077*** 0.057* 0.081*** 0.041 0.085*** 0.073** 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.070***
t + 3 0.024* 0.057*** 0.027 0.057*** 0.049 0.062*** 0.034 0.038*** 0.026* 0.062***
INTEREST RATE
t -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.022** -0.015*** -0.030*** -0.015*** -0.010 -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.020***
t + 1 -0.023*** -0.014*** -0.011 -0.011*** -0.024*** -0.012*** -0.001 -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.015***
t + 2 -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.013* -0.013*** -0.027*** -0.014*** -0.002 -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.014***
t + 3 -0.013*** -0.009** -0.014* -0.008** -0.020* -0.009* 0.000 -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.008**
p(DEFAULT=1)
t -0.024*** 0.007 -0.010 -0.010* -0.033*** -0.009 -0.013 -0.011*** -0.025*** -0.001
t + 1 -0.007*** -0.013** -0.011 0.017*** 0.013 -0.018** -0.020 -0.007 -0.012* -0.003
t + 2 -0.005*** -0.006 -0.027 -0.023*** 0.020 -0.024** -0.037 -0.001 -0.009 0.008
t + 3 -0.001*** 0.002 -0.020 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 0.006 0.000 0.014
DEFAULT RATIO
t -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.008* 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000
t + 1 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.009* -0.001 0.000 -0.001** -0.002** 0.000
t + 2 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.005 -0.003** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.001
t + 3 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
* Significance level of 10%.
** Significance level of 5%.
*** Significance level of 1%.
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Table VII confirms that the credit guarantee scheme increased the overall amount of
credit across all participating firms (Hypothesis 1). The treatment effect was stronger,
however, for micro- and small-sized companies (columns [1] and [2]). In fact, after the
third year, there were no statistical differences for the medium-sized firms that accessed
the EXP Programme ([7]). By contrast, the EXP line showed a higher impact for small-
and micro-sized firms ([5] and [6]) in comparison to the SME line ([9] and [10]). This
result is obviously related with different amounts granted by these two programmes. Nev-
ertheless, both results corroborate a credit increase for participants, notably for- micro-
and small-sized firms (Hypothesis 1b), refuting the substitution hypothesis (Hypothesis
3).
Similarly to the base case, both lines proved to reduce participants’ short-term credit
needs and interest expenses efficiently (Hypothesis 2). However, for micro-sized firms
that accessed EXP line, the increase in long-term loans only held for two periods. Bearing
in mind that the volume of credit increased and interest rates remained lower for the
participants, this suggests that credit lines were renewed for these firms but with a shorter
maturity.
The comparison across sizes of firms also shows that the EXP Programme had lim-
ited effects for medium-sized firms. This set of participants experienced a decrease in
their short-term funding needs, but the price of loans remained broadly the same when
compared to non-participants. These differences also suggest that the EXP credit line was
more efficient for small- and micro-, rather than medium-sized firms.
Finally, the credit guarantee scheme also seemed to reduce the probability of default
for micro- and small-sized firms efficiently. This effect is particularly strong in the EXP
line, with small-sized participants showing a likelihood of defaulting, after two years,
2.4% lower than non-participants. Table VII also shows that micro-sized firms that joined
the SME credit line recorded a smaller proportion of defaulted loans compared to the
control group. However, both effects only lasted for the duration of the programme,
reinforcing the observation that the banks were able to create monitoring synergies by
closely following these loans (Hypothesis 4), but only for the micro-sized firms.
6.3.2 Economic spillovers
The baseline scenario showed that the Portuguese credit scheme contributes efficiently
to increasing employment, exports and turnover volume across the sample of enrolled
firms. However, and as shown in the previous section, this effect was not homogeneous
















































































TABLE VIII: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT ON TREATED
EMPLOYMENT, TURNOVER AND EXPORTS
Programme
EXP Programme SME Programme
Variables Micro Small Medium Total Micro Small Medium Total Micro Small
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
EMP
t 0.033*** 0.006 0.018* 0.014 * 0.029 0.011 0.009 0.016** 0.034*** 0.003
t + 1 0.052*** 0.036*** 0.029* 0.047*** 0.080** 0.044*** 0.019 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.019*
t + 2 0.041** 0.049*** 0.021 0.069*** 0.101** 0.070*** 0.015 0.028*** 0.033* 0.027**
t + 3 0.044** 0.066*** 0.024 0.091*** 0.140*** 0.091*** 0.012 0.030** 0.028 0.031**
TURNOVER
t 0.016 0.010 0.005 0.026** 0.024 0.033*** -0.018 0.001 0.010 -0.005
t + 1 0.027* 0.020 0.009 0.044*** 0.097 ** 0.042*** -0.025 0.000 0.009 -0.010
t + 2 0.021 0.041** 0.014 0.071*** 0.102* 0.069*** -0.016 0.005 0.003 0.006
t + 3 0.010 0.058*** 0.004 0.102*** 0.140** 0.104*** -0.015 -0.008 -0.024 -0.001
EXPORTS
t -0.113** 0.034 0.114 0.140*** 0.187 0.127** 0.092 -0.089** -0.133** 0.000
t + 1 -0.083 0.026 0.016 0.131*** -0.080 0.115** 0.028 -0.045 - 0.088 0.025
t + 2 -0.099* 0.0108* -0.054 0.151*** -0.043 0.143** 0.066 -0.018 -0.124* 0.074
t + 3 -0.081 0.170*** -0.146 0.225*** 0.050 0.229*** -0.005 -0.025 -0.114* 0.046
EXTERNAL WEIGHT
t -0.021*** -0.002 -0.015 0.009* -0.006 0.007 -0.012 -0.017*** -0.027*** -0.007
t + 1 -0.019** -0.007 -0.013 0.000 -0.029 -0.005 -0.005 -0.012** -0.022*** -0.004
t + 2 -0.029*** 0.007 -0.010 0.016** -0.032 0.012 -0.004 -0.011** -0.030*** 0.004
t + 3 -0.026*** 0.012 -0.017 0.022*** -0.033 0.021** 0.006 -0.013** -0.031*** -0.001
* Significance level of 10%.
** Significance level of 5%.
*** Significance level of 1%.
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The detailed results (Table VIII) suggest that the programme was particularly efficient
in increasing the labour force in micro- and small-sized firms (Hypothesis 5a). This effect
was mainly stronger for the firms that accessed the EXP Programme, with a difference
of 14.0% and 9.1% respectively for micro- and small-sized companies, when compared
to the control group. To a lesser extent, the SME-participants also recorded an overall
increase (3.0%) of their number of employees, although for micro-firms there is no statis-
tical evidence that this effect held after the programme’s end. As in the previous section,
the results also pointed out a limited effect on medium-sized firms, with the treated and
untreated firms experiencing a minor, but positive, statistical difference27 in employment
(EMP) only in the first two years (more 1.8% and 2.9%, respectively).
The EXP credit line was also particularly effective in promoting the increase of turnover
among micro- and small-sized firms. This trend, however, was driven by different factors.
The results of the study suggest that participant firms became more competitive in in-
ternational markets, increasing their EXPORTS by 22.9% compared to non-participants.
The turnover growth experienced by micro-sized firms is mainly explained by an increase
in the domestic market, as there is no statistical evidence to support a difference between
treated and untreated firms in their overall amount of exports. On the other hand, simi-
larly to the effects on the job market, this credit line also seemed to be unsuccessful in
promoting turnover and export growth for medium-sized firms. Together with the results
shown in the previous section, this last effect indicates that the EXP Programme should
be redesigned to achieve higher efficiency among medium-sized firms.
Table VIII also shows that there is no statistical evidence supporting the assumption
that the SME Programme promoted an increase of turnover and exports for its partici-
pants. In fact, one may see that micro-firms that accessed this line preferred to focus
their economic activity on the domestic market, showing a significant decrease of exports
(-11.4%) and, consequently, a reduction of the proportion of international transactions
(EXTERNAL WEIGHT) on their balance sheets (-3.1%). Taken together, these results
confirm that the EXP Programme was particularly efficient at promoting export growth
for small- and micro-sized firms (Hypothesis 5b). On the other hand, there is no statis-
tical evidence supporting a similar effect over micro- and small-sized firms for the SME
Programme.
6.3.3 Profitability
The Portuguese CGS also established that the credit granted could only be used to
invest in fixed assets or to reinforce firms’ operating capital. Both objectives focused on
improving participants’ ex-post performance, in particular by allowing them to implement
27At a significant level of 10%.
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profitable projects producing net positive present value (Hypothesis 6). Economic liter-
ature, however, also recognises that by easing requirements on collateral and third-party
guarantees, the CGS might exacerbate information problems. For example, managers
may take riskier investments (Stulz and Johnson, 1985) or be less likely to exert man-
agerial effort (Boot et al., 1991) when their assets are not pledged as collateral. Also, as
this objective may only be accomplished at the end of the programme and there is a high
volatility associated with the situation, it is less likely that banks and national competent
authorities would be able to follow and measure its effects.
Even though the participant firms experienced an increase in the overall amount of
funds available (Hypothesis 1), there is no statistical evidence that this credit has been
correctly directed to more profitable projects (Hypothesis 6). As in the base case, Table
IX shows that both credit lines seemed unsuccessful in promoting an overall increase in
treated firms’ profits (∆NET PROFITS and ∆ROA)28. However, there is also no evidence
that these firms underperformed in comparison to non-participants. This shows that, al-
though treated observations were not able to find and adopt higher-earning projects, the
absence of statistical differences for the control group rules out the option of guarantee
users succumb to moral hazard and, therefore, decrease their profitability and/or have a
higher probability of falling into financial distress (as in). This is a very interesting result
in comparison to similar schemes implemented in Italy (D’Ignazio and Menon, 2012) and
Japan (Uesugi et al., 2010), where most of the participants underperformed after accessing
the scheme.
Indeed, there are positive and statistical differences for the net value of micro- and
medium-sized firms that accessed the EXP Programme. Although both sets of treated
firms were unable to adopt profitable projects with a positive net present value, its man-
agers were capable of raising these companies’ value.
28With one exception: the small firms that accessed the SME Programme showed a marginal increase of
















































































TABLE IX: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT ON TREATED
PROFITABILITY
Programme
EXP Programme SME Programme
Variables Micro Small Medium Total Micro Small Medium Total Micro Small
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
NET PROFITS
t 0.000 0.001 0.040 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.034 -0.001 0.000 0.000
t + 1 0.005 -0.008 -0.020 0.009 0.013 -0.016 -0.015 0.000 0.003 -0.006
t + 2 0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.007 -0.006 -0.013 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
t + 3 0.000 -0.006 0.015 -0.008 -0.011 -0.018 0.031 -0.005 0.000 -0.011
ROA
t -0.005* 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.007* 0.004
t + 1 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.000 0.004
t + 2 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.006* 0.002 0.008**
t + 3 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.012 -0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003
NET VALUE
t 0.000 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000
t + 1 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.010*** 0.000 0.010* 0.000 0.000 0.000
t + 2 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.011*** 0.001 0.014** 0.000 0.001 0.000
t + 3 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.011*** 0.002 0.014** 0.000 0.000 0.000
* Significance level of 10%.
** Significance level of 5%.
*** Significance level of 1%.
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7 CONCLUSION
Guarantee schemes are widespread in both developed and developing countries, where
they are currently seen as effective instrument for improving the firms’ access to credit
markets, especially for SMEs. Most of these schemes are publicly funded, and this policy
approach is often recommended by international organisations (D’Ignazio and Menon,
2012). Although these initiatives are popular, economic theory has not yet determined
their net effect on participating firms.
This paper has examined empirically the effects of a broad government credit guaran-
tee scheme on loan availability and the ex-post performance of firms. The programmes
PME Investe III and IV are an excellent test case, because both were implemented on a
large scale, for a limited period, and were uniformly available to almost all Portuguese
SMEs. To measure their impact, this study relied on a unique set of panel data covering
small firms and their liabilities to the financial sector. Using a difference-in-difference
matching method, the paper has evaluated the treatment effect of the policy on a number
of potential outcome variables – such as the bank debt of each firm, its debt structure,
its interest expenses, its profitability and the probability of default – for four years after
joining the scheme.
The results have shown that this Portuguese CGS successfully mitigated the infor-
mation asymmetries in the credit market, with programme participants experiencing an
overall increase of credit in comparison to nonparticipants. More importantly, this growth
continued after the programme ended, even during the severe contraction of credit lending
to SMEs experienced in Portugal after 2011. The programme also helped participants to
reduce their short-term debt needs and their interest expenses. The results showed that
the policy led to a statistically significant increase in the proportion of long term debt, and
that treated firms were able to renegotiate their debt structure even after the guarantees
ceased. The introduction of this scheme also led to lower interest rates for the beneficiary
firms, achieving one of the main aims of the policy.
The design of the scheme also contributed to reducing the moral hazard among bor-
rowers. All loans granted were partially guaranteed by a public institution, splitting the
risk between the bank and the state. This design seemed to encourage careful assess-
ment and monitoring of the participants’ performance, reducing the overall probability
of default. This was particularly important for the Portuguese financial system, helping
the banks to reduce their risk-weighted exposures, and therefore to improve their capital
ratios under the Basel Accord.
Moreover, there is also statistical evidence of economic spillover effects. The treated
firms experienced a positive and significant difference regarding employment growth,
turnover, exports and net value in comparison to the control group. However, there is
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no evidence that the programme helped the participants to find and invest in more prof-
itable projects. This suggests that further mechanisms should be implemented, such as
controlling the type of investments that these loans can be used for, to improve the overall
performance of these firms.
In a similar vein, these effects were not homogenous across firms differing in size
and credit. The design and features of the scheme were slightly different between pro-
grammes; these differences allowed the magnitude of the effects to be distinguished
among different kinds of firms programmes. The credit line directed to exporters (EXP
Programme) had limited effects among medium-sized firms, suggesting that the pro-
gramme design should be reshaped for these entities. Moreover, although the programme
directed to smaller firms (SME Programme) increased the overall level of credit, there is
also statistical evidence that the participant firms reduced their international transactions,
such as their volume of exports.
This study, however, opens some space for further developments. The results covered
four years after the participants accessed the scheme. This obviously poses limitations,
and a longer term could be used in the future to assess the effect of loan guarantees on the
profitability of participants. More importantly, this study did not examine the operating
costs of the scheme. As this is a key feature of this kind of economic policy, a cost-benefit
analysis should be conducted to determine whether or not these programmes should be
expanded. Last but not least, Portugal experienced a period of credit constraint, with
most of the banks reducing their volume of retail lending and facing additional regulatory
capital requirements. Determining how this scenario affected the borrower-guarantee-
lender relationship between firms, the credit guarantee scheme and undercapitalised banks
would also be of interest to further understand the effectiveness of this scheme.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Variables
TABLE A1: VARIABLES DEFINITION
Variable name Definition
Programme accessibility
PMEt 1 if the firm enrols in PME programme in t, 0 otherwise
ELIGIBLEt
1 if the firm meets all the criteria to enrol in the programme in t, 0
otherwise
EMP <= 50 1 if the firm has 50 or less employees in t− 1, 0 otherwise
EXT. TRANS. >= 10%
1 if the proportion of firm’s exports and imports is equal or greater than
10% of their turnover in t− 1, 0 otherwise
TURNOVER <= 10
million
1 if the firm has a turnover of less than EUR 10 million in t− 1, 0
otherwise
GUARANTEE VALUE Total amount of guarantees granted
GUARANTEE RATIO Ratio of programme value over total bank credit
MGS A
1 if the firm is geographically located in the MGS A jurisdiction, 0
otherwise
MGS B
1 if the firm is geographically located in the MGS B jurisdiction, 0
otherwise
MGS C
1 if the firm is geographically located in the MGS C jurisdiction, 0
otherwise
Bank relationships
CREDIT Total amount of the firm’s banking credit
LOAN RATIO Ratio of total loans to total liabilities
LONG RATIO
Ratio of medium- and long-term loans (loans with more than 1 year of
maturity) to total liabilities
SHORT RATIO Ratio of short-term loans to total liabilities
INTEREST RATE Ratio of interest payments to total amount of loans
DEFAULT 1 if the borrower has at least one defaulted loan, 0 otherwise
DEFAULT RATIO Ratio of amount of loans past due to total amount of loans
BANKS Number of banks per firm
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Variable name Definition
Performance
ROA Ratio of business profits to total assets
ICOVER Ratio of business profits to interest payments (Interest coverage ratio)
ICOVER Dummy 1 if the ICOVER is less than one, 0 otherwise
DCOVER Ratio of business profits to total credit (Debt coverage ratio)
DCOVER Dummy 1 if the DCOVER is less than 10%, 0 otherwise
NEGATIVE CAP.
Dummy
1 if the Capital Ratio (firm’s net worth/total assets) is negative, 0
otherwise
NET PROFIT Total amount of the firm’s end-of-year profits
TURNOVER Total amount of the firm’s turnover
EXPORTS Total amount of the firm’s exports
General characteristics
EMP Number of employees
ASSETS Total value of the firm’s assets
NET VALUE Total amount of firm’s net worth (Total assets less total liabilities)
EXTERNAL WEIGHT Ratio of external transactions (Imports + Exports) to total turnover
MICRO, SMALL and
MEDIUM
Dummy variable, identifying firms’ size as defined in the Commission
Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (C(2003)1422) (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003,
p. 36).
CAE Dummy variables identifying firms’ activity sector.
REGIONAL Dummy variables identifying firms’ district.
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A.2 Assessing the quality of matches
The quality of matches is assessed by examining the distribution of covariates used in
the propensity scores estimation within each matching exercise. Table A.2 shows the p-
value of the standard t-test for the equality of mean sample values, the standardised bias
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) and the joint significance tests and pseudo-R2 (Sianesi,
2004). This table details only the assessment of the sample of placed individuals in the
PME Programme in the post-programme period.






in | bias |Treated Control
ELIGIBLE 20093
Unmatched 0.98 0.84 0.000
Matched 0.98 0.98 0.827 -0.3 99.3
EMPLOYEES 503
Unmatched 0.92 0.94 0.000
Matched 0.92 0.92 0.872 -0.5 94.5
EXTERNAL TRA.3
Unmatched 0.78 0.76 0.182
Matched 0.78 0.77 0.772 0.8 76.1
TURNOVER3
Unmatched 0.99 0.99 0.573
Matched 0.99 0.99 0.911 -0.3 79.0
MGS A3
Unmatched 0.21 0.14 0.000
Matched 0.21 0.22 0.318 -3.0 85.3
MGS B3
Unmatched 0.59 0.60 0.318
Matched 0.59 0.57 0.330 2.7 -9.1
LOAN RATIO
Unmatched 0.46 0.38 0.000
Matched 0.46 0.46 0.873 0.4 98.5
SHORT RATIO
Unmatched 0.39 0.36 0.011
Matched 0.39 0.39 0.931 -0.2 96.4
BANKS
Unmatched 1.87 1.77 0.000
Matched 1.87 1.86 0.635 1.1 94.6
ICOVER SM3
Unmatched 0.57 0.54 0.053
Matched 0.57 0.58 0.591 -1.5 69.2
ICOVER BANK3
Unmatched 0.64 0.59 0.000
Matched 0.64 0.64 0.965 -0.1 98.9
NEG. CAPITAL3
Unmatched 0.00 0.05 0.000
Matched 0.00 0.00 0.874 0.2 99.5
SMALL FIRM3
Unmatched 0.63 0.49 0.000
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in | bias |Treated Control
Matched 0.63 0.63 0.750 0.9 96.9
MEDIUM FIRM3
Unmatched 0.09 0.06 0.000
Matched 0.09 0.09 0.927 0.3 97.3
lnASSETS
Unmatched 14.02 13.62 0.000
Matched 14.02 14.01 0.670 1.1 97.2
lnASSETS2
Unmatched 197.58 186.76 0.000
Matched 197.58 197.28 0.684 1.1 97.2
CAST. BRANCO3
Unmatched 0.02 0.01 0.000
Matched 0.02 0.01 0.589 1.6 81.3
COIMBRA3
Unmatched 0.03 0.02 0.003
Matched 0.03 0.04 0.634 -1.5 79.7
EVORA3
Unmatched 0.01 0.01 0.328
Matched 0.01 0.01 0.807 -0.7 69.5
FARO3
Unmatched 0.02 0.01 0.135
Matched 0.02 0.02 0.799 0.7 79.6
LEIRIA3
Unmatched 0.12 0.07 0.000
Matched 0.12 0.13 0.339 -3.0 82.3
PORTO3
Unmatched 0.23 0.25 0.066
Matched 0.23 0.22 0.732 0.9 79.7
SANTAREM3
Unmatched 0.04 0.03 0.033
Matched 0.04 0.04 0.808 -0.7 86.1
SETUBAL3
Unmatched 0.02 0.03 0.003
Matched 0.02 0.02 0.829 -0.5 93.1
VISEU3
Unmatched 0.03 0.03 0.432
Matched 0.03 0.03 0.877 0.4 78.9
CAE C3
Unmatched 0.44 0.39 0.000
Matched 0.44 0.44 0.816 0.6 94.3
CAE G3
Unmatched 0.38 0.36 0.185
Matched 0.38 0.38 0.865 -0.5 85.6
CAE H1
Unmatched 0.07 0.10 0.000
Matched 0.07 0.07 0.900 0.3 97.2
CAE J3
Unmatched 0.02 0.02 0.042
Matched 0.02 0.02 0.952 0.1 97.1
CAE M3
Unmatched 0.04 0.05 0.016
Matched 0.04 0.04 0.895 -0.3 94.4
CAE P3
Unmatched 0.00 0.00 0.033
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in | bias |Treated Control
Matched 0.00 0.00 0.829 -0.3 94.3
Observations
On common support 2637 4031
Off support 4 241
Unmatched Matched
| Bias | summary statistics:
Mean 13 0.9
Med. Bias 7.7 0.6
Maximum 78.2 5.3
Minimum 0.36 1
% Var 73 18
Pseudo R-square4 0.189 0.001
LR test p-value 999.19 3.7
1 The p-value for the t-test measures the equality of means in the treated and control groups, both before
and after matching.
2 % Bias is the standardised bias as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), shown together with the
achieved percentage reduction in | bias |.
3 Dummy variables.
4 Pseudo R-square from the logit model estimation of the propensity scores, including all variables shown
in Table IV before and after the matching process (Sianesi, 2004).
Starting with the standard t-tests for the equality of means for the treatment and con-
trol groups for each of the variables included in the specification of the propensity score
model, there are two noteworthy results. First, as already pointed out in Table IV – Sum-
mary statistics, there is a remarkable similarity between the treatment and control group’s
mean values before matching. Nonetheless, from a purely statistical point of view, the
mean values are different from each other for most variables. This leads to the second
point. After matching, the null hypothesis (of mean equality between the treatment and
control groups for all variables) cannot be rejected.
In the following columns, the table reports the standardised bias as suggested by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), and the reduction in the absolute bias obtained after match-
ing control and treatment units. One oft-noted pitfall of this indicator is the fact that it has
no formal (statistical) threshold for assessing of the reduction in mean bias (Caliendo and
Kopeining, 2008). Nevertheless, the values obtained seem to grant some success in the
matching procedure, with reductions as large as 99.5 percent, and are in line with previ-
ous empirical studies (Uesugi et al., 2010; Sianesi, 2004). At the bottom of the table, the
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overall summary statistics for the absolute bias are also shown. The mean absolute bias
in the matched sample is 0.9, while in the unmatched sample is 13.
Finally, and as proposed by Sianesi (2004), the joint statistical significance of the co-
variates and the pseudo-R of the propensity score in the unmatched and matched samples
were studied. As can be seen in the last two rows of Table A2, the pseudo-R in the propen-
sity score estimation that used only the treated units and the matched control units falls
to values close to zero. The F -test complements this information, corroborating the view
that matching has successfully eliminated any systematic observable differences between
the treated and control groups.
58
